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Virgin vs. Chad: On Enforced Monogamy as a Solution to the Incel Problem 
 
Abstract 
Among the more controversial stances taken by psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson 
is that “enforced monogamy” is an advisable solution for societies with high percentages of “incels.” 
This view has a certain currency in manosphere circles; but as the reasoning for it remains rather 
enthymematic, in this chapter I summarize and evaluate the best case I can think of for thinking 
enforced monogamy is a justifiable remedy for this particular social ill. As I see it, the case is 
premised upon the moral imperative of civilizational sustainability, and its advocates must fight on 
two fronts: one against polygamous mating patterns, and another against socially monogamous 
mating patterns that are nonetheless sexually liberal. After exploring reasons to think that each 
mating pattern results in unsustainable proportions of unattached young men, I conclude that, given 
the premises, socially monogamous societies are probably justified in maintaining their anti-
polygamist social and legal norms. The case for imposing stricter sexual norms on socially 
monogamous but sexually liberal societies is weaker, however, as male involuntary celibacy isn’t in 
those places as directly caused by male intrasexual competition, and since less intrusive social 
interventions—some of which Peterson himself has undertaken—are more likely to ameliorate “the 
incel problem.”  
 
Introduction 
In April 2018, 25-year-old Alek Minassian mowed down more than two dozen Toronto pedestrians 
with his van, killing ten. A self-described “incel” (an internet portmanteau of “involuntary celibate”), 
Minassian was inspired by Elliot Rodger, whose own mass killing was, according to the latter’s 
manifesto, similarly motivated by a deep resentment of female rejection.1 “The Incel Rebellion has 
already begun!” Minassian posted on Facebook just before his killing spree. “We will overthrow all 
the Chads and Stacys! All hail the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger!”2  
 
1 Dan Bilefsky and Ian Austen, “Toronto Van Attack Suspect Expressed Anger at Women,” New York Times, April 24, 
2018,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/world/canada/toronto-van-rampage.html. 
2 Mack Lamoureux, “A Brief History of ‘Incel,’ the Misogynistic Group Allegedly Cited By Toronto Van Attacker,” Vice, 
April 24, 2018,  
https://www.vice.com/en/article/pax9kz/a-brief-history-of-incel-the-misogynistic-group-allegedly-cited-by-toronto-
van-attacker. 
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Soon after, University of Toronto psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson was asked by 
New York Times journalist Nellie Bowles for his thoughts about the tragedy.  
“He was angry at God because women were rejecting him,” Mr. Peterson says of the 
Toronto killer. “The cure for that is enforced monogamy. That’s actually why monogamy 
emerges.” Mr. Peterson does not pause when he says this. Enforced monogamy is, to him, 
simply a rational solution. Otherwise women will all only go for the most high-status men, 
he explains, and that couldn’t make either gender happy in the end. “Half the men fail,” he 
says, meaning that they don’t procreate. “And no one cares about the men who fail.” 
I laugh, because it is absurd. 
“You’re laughing about them,” he says, giving me a disappointed look. “That’s because 
you’re female.” […] In situations where there is too much mate choice, “a small percentage 
of the guys have hyper-access to women, and so they don’t form relationships with women,” 
he said. “And the women hate that.”3 
Peterson’s endorsement of “enforced monogamy” drew the ire of the commentariat, many of whom 
interpreted the phrase as a Handmaid’s Tale-type scenario or associated it with the crudest forms of 
sexual coercion. Common among these critiques was the claim that Peterson was assuming some 
sort of right to sex on behalf of incels.4 Peterson replied in subsequent interviews and tweets that 
“enforced monogamy” is a well-established term in anthropology and related fields (when I restrict 
the search to 2017 and earlier, Google Scholar reports 550 publications using that phrase and about 
103 using “normative monogamy,” which means the same thing). Peterson noted in a blog post 
about the controversy that he doesn’t base his case for enforced monogamy on a right to sex or 
spouses, but rather on the pragmatic social benefits of monogamy. 
Men get frustrated when they are not competitive in the sexual marketplace (note: the fact 
that they DO get frustrated does not mean that they SHOULD get frustrated. Pointing out 
the existence of something is not the same as justifying its existence). Frustrated men tend to 
become dangerous, particularly if they are young. The dangerousness of frustrated young 
men (even if that frustration stems from their own incompetence) has to be regulated 
socially. The manifold social conventions tilting most societies toward monogamy constitute 
such regulation.  
That’s all. 
 
3 Nellie Bowles, “Jordan Peterson, Custodian of the Patriarchy,” New York Times, May 18, 2018, 
 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/style/jordan-peterson-12-rules-for-life.html 
4 See e.g., David Futrelle, who writes 
You can’t solve the problem of aggrieved male entitlement by engineering some weird and at least semi-
coercive program of “enforced monogamy” built on the assumption that men inherently deserve some sort of 
access to women’s bodies—regardless of what the women inhabiting these bodies want. You can’t rid the 
world of violence born of aggrieved male entitlement with a “solution” that reinforces that sense of 
entitlement. 
“The Dark Corners of the Internet that Spawned Ideas Like ‘Enforced Monogamy,’” Vice, May 25, 2018, 
https://www.vice.com/en/article/d3k3ex/jordan-peterson-enforced-monogamy-incels.  
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No recommendation of police-state assignation of woman to man (or, for that matter, man 
to woman). 
No arbitrary dealing out of damsels to incels. 
Nothing scandalous (all innuendo and suggestive editing to the contrary). 
Just the plain, bare, common-sense facts: socially-enforced monogamous conventions 
decrease male violence. In addition (and not trivially) they also help provide mothers with 
comparatively reliable male partners, and increase the probability that stable, father-intact 
homes will exist for children.5 
In this chapter, I will construct an argument premised on the “incel problem” and concluding with 
the remedy of “enforcing monogamy,” which I will henceforth refer to as the “Enforced Monogamy 
Inference,” or EMI. (I cast the issue in terms of an “inference” rather than a mere call for “enforced 
monogamy” in order to focus our attention on the fact that we’re talking about a proposed solution 
to a certain problem—namely, high rates of involuntarily celibate men—as opposed to a general call 
for enforced monogamy or a monogamist position motivated by another other rationale, such as 
some religious scruple against extra-marital sex.) If EMI were the brainchild of Peterson alone, 
discussion of it would not be warranted here. But EMI is it not idiosyncratic to Peterson: it, in whole 
or in part, has a great deal of currency in the manospshere, and it might be beneficial for students 
and scholars of sex ethics to think through it. I stress this an acquaintance with the inference from the 
“incel problem” to enforced monogamy: in a discussion of this size, it is impossible to advance a 
thoroughgoing analysis of its soundness. Readers are welcome to fill gaps in my reasoning and/or 
pursue lines of thought only gestured at here. 
Note that Peterson is concerned  not just about unhappily-alone young men, but also the larger 
social implications of the incel phenomenon (since inceldom is an identity, I will try to reserve 
“incel” for men who self-identify as incels, and “involuntarily celibate” for the much larger class of 
involuntarily celibate men). Advocates of EMI-type thinking tend to be social pragmatists who feel 
our mating patterns not only profoundly affect, but are also beholden to, social wellbeing. Thus I 
begin by advancing a moral premise that advocates of EMI are likely to sympathize with, which sees 
mating patterns as morally limited by social or civilizational sustainability. I then summarize some 
well-established social scientific research suggesting that polygamy, as compared to monogamy, is 
indeed significantly disadvantageous to civilizational advance. After that I pivot away from how EMI 
applies to polygamous cultures to how it applies to our own. This raises a conceptual problem for 
EMI: is it about relieving intrasexual competition on behalf of involuntary celibates by restricting the 
availability of the best-positioned men, as one might gather from the monogamy vs. polygamy 
framing? Or is it about decreasing the percentage of involuntarily celibate men, which is a much broader 
project? I explore the former as it might apply to a sexually unregulated but socially monogamous 
mating market. Advocates of EMI can and do draw from the sexual economics literature to argue 
that liberal sexual mores, in conjunction with certain facts about innate sex differences and 
reproductive technology, result in a degraded form of polygamy on the mating market, thereby 
encumbering modern socially monogamous societies with some of polygamy’s downsides. In the 
 
5 Jordan Peterson, “On the New York Times and “Enforced Monogamy,” Jordan B Peterson blog, 
https://www.jordanbpeterson.com/media/on-the-new-york-times-and-enforced-monogamy/ 
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final section I step back and conclude that “enforced monogamy,” in the sense of normative anti-
polygamy, is probably justified for non-polygamous societies if we accept civilizational sustainability as 
a baseline. On the other hand, “enforced monogamy,” in the sense of imposing stricter sexual and 
marital monogamous norms, is not yet warranted, since less intrusive interventions—interventions 
Peterson himself is exemplary of—are likely to be more effective.  
Social and civilizational sustainability as a necessary condition for sex ethics 
Environmentally conscious people generally agree that we must strive to live sustainably. Of course, 
accepting environmental sustainability as a baseline is perfectly compatible with acknowledging a 
defeasible right to high-consumption lifestyles: if you like “rolling coal” in big trucks as opposed to 
buzzing about in tiny hybrids, or if you prefer to spend your leisure time crisscrossing the globe 
instead of gardening, that is your business. Even so, we generally think the prima facie right to such 
freedoms might be outweighed if the costs of exercising these freedoms are externalized to others 
and to future generations. Although in some cases we should call for an absolute prohibition on a 
particular high-consumption industry, product, or practice in the name of sustainability, we will 
typically call merely for an internalization of the real costs of making these things sustainable, which 
may or may not price them out of the market—calls to remove beef subsidies are one example.6 
Granted, which practices are sustainable is a difficult question, since the set of sustainable practices 
grows, shrinks, or shifts based on a host of changing social, psychological, and technological factors, 
each of whose relevance to environmental outcomes is also disputed. And granted, what even 
counts as a “sustainable” solution conceptually is also controversial. (Is a presently unsustainable 
practice “sustainable” if it is predictably sustainable in the long-term? How anthropocentric may a 
“sustainable” outcome be? Is a high-consumption practice “unsustainable” if it is counterbalanceable by 
other measures?) But even in the absence of consensus on their answers, we usually hold that we 
must try to make our societies environmentally sustainable. Most of us would add that, even in the 
absence of laws or regulations enforcing sustainable behavior—and perhaps even more urgently in 
the absence of such regulations—we have a significant prima facie obligation to create and adhere to 
norms that do a good job of incentivizing people to consume more responsibly, to invent green 
technologies, to create businesses that make what are likely to be sustainable practices profitable, 
convenient, and fun. In sum, it isn’t very controversial to say that environmentally conscious people 
should want to raise the costs of environmentally unsustainable lifestyles and lower the hurdles to 
environmentally sustainable lifestyles.  
More controversial than environmental sustainability is a commitment to social or civilizational 
sustainability. Or maybe not: for although conservatives are more likely to worry about social and 
civilizational sustainability using those terms, it is not uncommon for people across the political 
spectrum in any polity to be concerned about high crime rates, violent factionalism, unhappy 
citizens, bad parenting, or shrinking birthrates. These concerns we should label “social” rather than 
“civilizational,” since tribal elders in the remotest villages fret over such matters at least as much as 
our leaders do. By “civilizational sustainability” I refer to a civilization’s need for massive public and 
private investment in things such as reliable physical infrastructure, science and technology hubs, 
 
6 Christina Sewell, “Removing the Meat Subsidy: Our Cognitive Dissonance Around Animal Agriculture,” Journal of 
International Affairs, February 11, 2020, https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/removing-meat-subsidy-our-cognitive-dissonance-
around-animal-agriculture.  
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cultural/arts institutions, and commons such as publicly funded schools, parks, hospitals, and 
edifying media. Extraordinary private and public investments in education, creative productivity, and 
public health are justifiable in no small part because we need to develop human capital if we hope to 
maintain, let alone advance, civilization: all those tech complexes, factories, labs, and studio spaces 
are worthless without healthy, talented, and motivated people to put them to use. (The link between 
civilizational and environmental sustainability is more than metaphorical, since the climate and 
energy crises themselves will be solved only by an advanced, creative civilization that has done a good 
job of developing and harnessing human capital.7) So our lifestyles should be not only 
environmentally sustainable, but socially and civilizationally sustainable as well.  
Importantly for our purposes, a society’s mating patterns8 are as critical as anything else to its 
prospects for social and civilizational survival. For instance, no reasonable person who cares about 
Japan can shrug off statistics showing that over 40% of Japanese people from 18-34 report never 
having sex, or that half of Japanese marriages are sexless.9 The negative consequences of a bad 
strategy with regard to sex, reproduction, and marriage are less immediate, perhaps, than those of a 
bad strategy with regard to agriculture or war, but no less disastrous in the long run. Thus, if we 
have good reasons to think some mating pattern is a threat to social or civilizational sustainability, 
then we should call for norms which, if not prohibiting that sexual lifestyle, at least make it costly. 
Prominent evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller is commendable in this regard for 
acknowledging the above points even though he demurs on the question of enforced monogamy as 
it intersects polyamory.10 “Sex-positive activists often argue that sexual relationships are matters of 
individual choice, and nobody else’s business,” he writes.11 “Yet,” Miller goes on,  
sexual relationships can impose good and bad side-effects (“positive and negative 
externalities”) on children, communities, economies, civilizations, and future generations. 
Mating markets matter. Sexual ethics matter. Reproductive choices matter. Families matter. 
That’s why we evolved instincts to stick our noses into other people’s sex lives, and why 
 
7 In addition, and too-often ignored, is the fact that asteroids are inevitable and grave environmental threats, and these 
cannot be identified and diverted by anything other than an advanced civilization—one quite a bit more advanced than 
our own. David J. Eicher, “Why the Asteroid Threat Should Be Taken Seriously,” Astronomy, n.d., 
https://astronomy.com/bonus/asteroidday. 
8 I’ll use “mating pattern” as a catchall term to cover not only “marriage patterns” (discussed in the next section) but also 
patterns of sexual behavior, along with the concomitant norms for each. 
9 Justin McCurry, “Record Numbers of Couples Living in Sexless Marriages in Japan, Says Report,” The Guardian, 
February 14, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/14/record-numbers-of-couples-living-in-sexless-
marriages-in-japan-says-report. 
10 Because of space constraints, I will not discuss polyamory here. Suffice it to say that I believe that, although 
polyamory-acceptance may indeed lead us down a slippery slope to polygamy-acceptance and legalization for reasons of 
philosophical or legal consistency, and although I think (for reasons discussed just below) that polygamy should remain 
illegal and socially unacceptable in societies that are currently monogamous, polyamory itself is orthogonal to polygamy, 
and anti-polygamy legislation does not (and should not) infringe on polyamory. 
11 Miller is not being uncharitable here: one book he assigns in his groundbreaking “Polyamory and Open Sexuality” 
course on the topic, Mark Michaels and Patricia Johnson’s Designer Relationships (2015), advocates for complete social 
neutrality between monogamy, polygamy, polyamory, or any other mating arrangement in order to allow people to 
choose what works best for them, and is dismissive of any social critiques in the very brief passages where social impacts 
are considered at all. 
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human sexuality has often been the most controversial domain of human politics and 
religion.12 
We may, after examining the evidence, come to different conclusions about the threats posed by 
some proposed or actual mating pattern, but we mustn’t dismiss sustainability objections ex ante 
because we assume there can be no connection between mating patterns and social and civilizational 
sustainability. 
Is monogamy civilizationally adaptive, as compared to polygamy?13 
Nellie Bowles laughed off as “absurd” Peterson’s appeal to hierarchies, high rates of involuntary 
celibacy, violence, and reproductive desperation in justifying enforced monogamy and its effect of, 
in an uncharitable manner of speaking, “redistributing” women to less desirable men.14 I suppose it 
may sound absurd to someone unfamiliar with the literature, much as the claim that cow flatulence 
could contribute to climate change sounds absurd to those who never bothered to research the 
question. But in fact, Peterson’s worries, if not his prescription, are perfectly familiar in the fields 
concerned with the societal impact of marriage patterns. In this section I summarize the strongest 
case for worrying about any mating pattern that (by design or not) distributes women to a 
significantly smaller fraction of men: that of evolutionary biologist Joe Henrich and his colleagues. 
Henrich’s 2010 amicus brief advising against legalizing polygamy in British Columbia15 served as the 
basis for his “Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage” (2012),16 a locus classicus of cultural evolution theory 
he co-authored with evolutionary biologists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson. The social and 
civilizational advantages of “normative monogamy” (Henrich et al.’s favored term for enforced 
monogamy) also figure prominently in Henrich’s The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West 
Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous (2020), which seeks to explain the global 
dominance of northwest European cultures in the modern world.17 
As Henrich et al. explain, the stability and effects of marriage patterns, which are socially enforced, 
cannot be understood without reference to underlying mating strategies, which are biological.18 
Humans are a significantly dimorphic species—not just physically, but also psychologically and 
behaviorally. As it concerns mating, the relevant behavioral dimorphism concerns, on the female 
side, strong observed sexual preferences for males of high status and/or genetic quality. For short-
term pairings or extra-pair couplings, genetic quality (as assessed by looks and charm) figure 
 
12 Geoffrey Miller, “Polyamory Is Growing—And We Need To Get Serious About It,” Quillette, October 29, 2019, 
https://quillette.com/2019/10/29/polyamory-is-growing-and-we-need-to-get-serious-about-it/. 
13 Because of considerations of space, I consider only polygyny here and ignore the extremely rare polyandrous form of 
polygamy.  
14 Cf. the controversy generated by Robin Hanson’s post “Comparing Income & Sex Redistribution,” Overcoming Bias 
blog, June 26, 2018, https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/06/comparing-income-sex-redistribution.html.  
15 Joseph Henrich, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Theory and Implications,” affidavit S-097767 submitted to 
the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada, July 15, 2010. Available: 
https://stoppolygamyincanada.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/joseph-henrichs-research-paper.pdf. 
16 Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, and Peter Richerson, “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B 367 (2012): 657–669. 
17 Joseph Henrich, The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous, 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2020. 
18 Henrich, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective,” 26. 
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relatively highly for women, while for long-term pairings qualities such as wealth, power, 
protectiveness, and commitment come to the fore.19  
These innate mating preferences, some of which are not unique to humans, are largely explained by 
the different levels of investment required by males and females to pass on their genes.20 Begetting 
children is far more costly to females, not only energetically but also in terms of opportunity costs 
for additional children, since women have a low cap on how many children they can have, even in 
the best of reproductive circumstances. This means evolution favored choosiness in females more 
than it did for males, since bad sexual decisions are more costly for females. It also means females 
are more attached to their children, since they have fewer chances than males do to pass on their 
genes. These considerations, when added to the fact that humans mature at a very slow rate, go a 
long way toward explaining the female bias in favor of mates possessing the genetic, material, and 
psychological means to help them produce and raise offspring who will not only survive to maturity, 
but also be well-positioned to pass on their genes because of their attractiveness on the mating 
market.21 
The upside for females is that most will reproduce: historically, the strong majority of women had 
children, and more than that husbands. Not so for men, whose chances of having a spouse or 
children seem to depend a great deal more on the culture they find themselves in. The mainstream 
account seems to be that, although most men probably had mates in small-scale foraging groups, the 
rise of large-scale agricultural societies resulted in bigger socio-economic gaps that resulted in larger 
harems for elites and correspondingly fewer females for males at the bottom of society. Researchers 
suggest that it is not uncommon for around 40% or more of men to go without a mate in a 
polygamous society.22  
Although Peterson’s concern for low-ranking men was received with great hostility, it is noteworthy 
that feminist philosophers often object to polygamy on the grounds that polygamy harms 
underprivileged women.23 Yet there is reason to think that, in material terms at least, it is high status 
women, and not low-status ones, who are the losers under polygamy.24 Whether women and girls are 
given away by their families or choose partners themselves, men of means are highly sought after 
and (quite unlike married women of means) these men are usually receptive to additional fertile-age 
spouses. Thus in such cultures, high-status men get high-status women as senior wives. Senior wives 
retain special prerogatives throughout their lifetimes, but nonetheless cede some clout as their 
husbands acquire junior wives. In contrast, securing high-status husbands is an important way up the 
social hierarchy for young and attractive lower-status females.25  
 
19 David Buss, “Sex Differences in Human Mate Preferences: Evolutionary Hypotheses Tested in 37 Cultures” Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 12, no. 1 (1989): 1–14. 
20 Robert Trivers, “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection,” in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man, 1871-1971, ed. B. 
Campbell (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), 52-95. 
21 See for updated research on mating strategies pt. 3 of David Buss, Evolutionary Psychology (New York: Routledge, 2019). 
22 Henrich, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective,” 40. 
23 See e.g. Emily Crookston, “Love and (Polygamous) Marriage? A Liberal Case Against Polygamy,” Journal of Moral 
Philosophy 12 no. 3 (2014): 267–289, esp. 283ff. 
24 In fairness, Crookston’s (see supra) concern is a moral injury, not a material one. 
25 William Jankowiak, Monika Sudakov, and Benjamin Wilreker, “Co-Wife Conflict and Co-operation,” Ethnology 44, no. 
1 (2005): 81-98.  
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On the male side of the ledger, polygamy can benefit successful men not only in terms of sex and 
children, but also materially: in traditional West African societies, for example, more wives mean 
more workers for a man’s plot of land. All these advantages redound to additional status and 
influence.26 (Once, in northern Ethiopia, I was informed by locals of a marriage taking place 
between a 50-something year-old Afar man and a 14-year girl—his sixth or seventh wife, some 
having died. This patriarch had almost sixty children and was able to procure a highly sought-after 
administrative sinecure simply because he had so many sons and grandsons that he posed a local 
security risk if not mollified by the government.) Although winners in this game, polygamous fathers 
are worse than monogamous ones on average, given that the resources they would otherwise spend 
on parental investment are spent courting new wives. A number of studies show significantly higher 
mortality rates for children in polygamous families in Mormon and African households, for instance, 
even after controlling for relevant variables.27 
Low-status men are, biologically-speaking, the worst-off of all four sex/status demographics, at 
serious risk of being deprived of any genetic legacy. As one would suspect, unattached males are far 
more prone to engage in self-destructive behaviors, such as gambling and drug use. Not all of these 
self-destructive behaviors are the cause of their being single, either: research suggests that men 
forsake much of their self-destructive behavior when they find mates—especially wives—since the 
domesticating influence of wives for at-risk men sees them working harder and spending less time 
hanging out with friends, drinking, using drugs, or wandering about in seedy areas looking for sex.28  
Preventing the loss of human, social, and civilizational capital of dissolute lives should be a concern 
for all of us, but it is those unattached men who do not silently succumb to despair who pose the 
greater threat to our societies. Evolution-based analyses predict,29 and we find, that polygamous 
cultures (and even polygamous subcultures within mixed societies) are consistently more violently 
criminal and unstable. Henrich, Boyd, and Richardson summarize research concluding that, 
controlling for a variety of relevant variables, marriage reduces the probability of a man’s criminality 
by 35%-50%. In their original work based on datasets drawn from crime reporting across 157 
countries and controlling for a variety of variables such as GDP, inequality, and democracy, they 
find that the pool of unmarried men is a significant predictor of rape and murder. Various natural 
experiments that resulted in spikes of males relative to females (such as China’s one-child policy, or 
massive influxes of male immigrants) also precede spikes in crime that, after many variables are 
controlled for, point to usual effects of desperate males who can only improve their chances of 
passing on their genes by engaging in risky, criminal, and/or revolutionary behavior.30  
Polygamy results in a scramble for unattached women, since even husbands continue to look for 
new wives. This drives down the age of marriage in such societies, and (since established males are 
favored over less-established males), widens the age gap between husbands and wives—often to the 
 
26 William Tucker, Marriage and Civilization (Washington DC, Regnery, 2014), ch. 8. That said, I know a high-status elderly 
rural Cameroonian woman who procured additional wives while her high-status husband was on a lengthy trip abroad, 
as she needed more help in their fields. When he returned, she informed him about his new wives, and it is a running 
joke in that household that these junior wives called her “husband.” 
27 See Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, “Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 665-666. 
28 Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, “Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 661-663. 
29 Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Homicide (New York, De Gruyter, 1988). 
30 Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, “Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 661-663. 
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tune of 20 years. Child marriage is not at all uncommon in polygynous societies, and in various such 
cultures girls may be promised before being born. Moreover, the mere fact that a wife has no 
monopoly on her husband’s reproduction or sexual satisfaction further lowers her bargaining power 
in the relationship. All these factors contribute to the domineering hyper-patriarchal family dynamics 
often seen in polygynous societies.31 Polygamy, for instance, encourages parents to aggressively 
interfere with their daughter’s choices. Because of the pressing demand for young women, bride 
prices are common, which incentivize parents to direct their daughters in more or less forceful ways 
to wealthy suitors (this money is often used to pay the bride price a brother needs to pay his fiancé’s 
family).32 Cultures practicing female genital cutting are almost always polygamous, and it is 
commonly said in these cultures that cutting is intended to “reduce the sexual demands on her 
husband, allowing him to have several wives” and lower the odds that a young, sexually-underserved 
young wife will stray when her polygamous husband is tending herds, raiding cattle, or otherwise 
occupied—a cheaper remedy than having one’s personal harem guarded by eunuchs.33  
For their part, Henrich and his collaborators theorize that monogamy was a cultural adaptation that 
allowed its adoptees to outcompete their polygamous rivals. The monogamous culture that has 
come down to us began in the Greek city-states of deep antiquity, where it served to reduce male 
intrasexual competition and build social cohesion. 34 Yes, high-caste Greek men of the archaic and 
classical era had a variety of sexual outlets, from barbarian prostitutes and slaves to young male 
mentees (consorting with Greek women other than one’s wife could mean death, however): for 
males, ancient Greeks and Romans advocated for only social monogamy. But prohibitions against 
additional wives or even concubines gave any male citizen a real chance of marriage, unlocking an 
untapped store of domestic energy from low-ranking men who, for the first time, had biological 
“skin in the game” for the survival and success of their polities. Monogamy clearly proved 
advantageous for Greek and, later, Roman societies, who played a large if not definitive role in 
shaping Jewish and Christian disapproval of polygamy. The spread of Christian monogamy across 
polygamous Europe encouraged equality, higher social trust, and higher levels of human 
development, all of which played a crucial role in European civilizational dominance. Colonialism 
spread this cultural meme around the world.35  
 
31 “We find,” say two researchers on the question,  
statistically significant relationships between polygyny and an entire downstream suite of negative consequences 
for men, women, children, and the nation-state, including the following outcomes: discrepancy between law 
and practice concerning women’s equality, birth rate, rates of primary and secondary education for male and 
female children, difference between males and females in HIV infection, age of marriage, maternal mortality, 
life expectancy, sex trafficking, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, inequity in the treatment of males 
and females before the law, defense expenditures, and political rights and civil liberties.  
Rose McDermott & Jonathan Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women”, Emory Law Journal 64, no. 6 (2015): 
1767-1814. Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol64/iss6/4. 
32 Gary Becker, A Treatise on the Family (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 56ff. See also Robert Guest, “The 
Link Between Polygamy and War,” The Economist, December 19, 2017, https://www.economist.com/christmas-
specials/2017/12/19/the-link-between-polygamy-and-war. 
33 Anika Rahman and Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Guide to Laws and Policies Worldwide (United 
Kingdom: Bloomsbury Academic, 2000): 5-6. 
34 Walter Scheidel, “A Peculiar Institution? Greco–Roman Monogamy in Global Context,” The History of the Family, 14 
no. 3, 280-291.  
35 Henrich, “Polygyny in Cross-Cultural Perspective,” 17-19; Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson, “Puzzle of Monogamous 
Marriage,” 666-667.  
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In concluding this section, I note that many of the social and civilizational downsides of polygamy 
are predictable even if that mating system doesn’t come in its “traditional” form. Indeed, many of 
the behaviors commonly associated with patriarchal and religious elements of traditional polygamy 
are probably effects of polygamy, not some independent force of patriarchy or religion. Given our 
evolved preferences, allowing unattached and attached men to pursue unattached women cannot but 
lead to a higher percentage of unattached males, more patriarchal control of women to protect them 
from this scramble, less parenting investment by males lucky enough to be successful at procuring 
mates, less civic buy-in from males shut out by the competition, and more internal tension between 
the reproductive haves and have-nots. As philosophers Cheshire Calhoun, Polycarp Ikuenobe, 
Andrew March and others have forcefully argued, liberal norms would seem to permit polygamy.36 
We have raised above an argument by analogy to environmental sustainability to the effect that the 
prima facie right people have, even on liberalism, to engage in consensual sexual and marital 
arrangements may be outweighed if those choices are civilizationally unsustainable. Whether 
polygamy’s liberal advocates have appreciated the dangers of polygamy in that regard is not clear. 
My sense is that philosophers usually disbelieve, ignore, or downplay the innate mating preferences 
that, when given any option of polygamy, foster the negative consequences described above.  
EMI as applied to our unregulated sexual market 
The rate of sexlessness among young American men is unprecedented in modern times and sloping 
sharply upward. According to a recent major report, from 2008 to 2018, the share of 18-24 year-old 
men having no sex in the previous year rose from 12% to 31%, and for men between 25-34 that 
number went from 7% to 14%.37 Similar trends are found internationally.38 Insofar as these figures 
represent men being outcompeted in the mating market, it is tempting to consider enforced 
monogamy as a regulatory intervention—we have called this the “enforcement of monogamy 
inference,” or EMI.  
That said, the sole explanation for these trends cannot be out-competition by elite males. Young 
women are having less sex, too, although the drop off for females is not as dramatic, and is more 
pronounced later in their lives.39 Factors commonly cited as causal of this more general “sex 
recession” include troubling increases in housing costs, student loan debt, obesity rates, anti-
depressant use, porn consumption, and cell-phone addiction.40 But how on earth would enforcing 
monogamy encourage young people to get off their cell phones, or help them out of their parents’ 
basements? We are thus forced to say a bit more about what the EMI concerns. Let’s disambiguate 
 
36 Cheshire Calhoun, “Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the 
History of Polygamy,” San Diego Law Review 42 (2005): 1023-1042; Polycarp Ikuenobe, “The Monogamous Conception 
of Romantic Love and Western Critiques of Polygamy in African Traditions,” Philosophical Papers 47, no. 3 (2018): 373–
401; Andrew March, “Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public 
Justification,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011): 246–272. 
37 Peter Ueda, Catherine Mercer, Cyrus Ghaznavi, and Debby Herbenick, “Trends in Frequency of Sexual Activity and 
Number of Sexual Partners Among Adults Aged 18 to 44 Years in the US, 2000-2018, JAMA 3(6) (June 12, 2020): 1-15. 
38 “Demographics of Inceldom,” Incelswiki, accessed November 2, 2020, 
https://incels.wiki/w/Demographics_of_inceldom#Young_incels_in_the_U.S.  
39 Christopher Ingraham, “The Share of Americans Not Having Sex has Reached a Record High,” Washington Post, 
March 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/29/share-americans-not-having-sex-has-
reached-record-high/.  
40 Kate Julian, “Why Are Young People Having So Little Sex?”, The Atlantic, December 2018,  
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/12/the-sex-recession/573949/. 
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between two interpretations. A narrow interpretation of EMI says that we should impose 
monogamous norms or policies specifically to reduce the competition involuntarily celibate men 
face from better-positioned (attractive, high-status, rich, etc.) rivals. A wide interpretation, on the 
other hand, says that monogamous norms would help involuntarily celibate men secure mates for a 
variety of reasons.  
Wide EMI is not fixated on direct male intrasexual competition. We can reduce the number of 
involuntary celibates if, say, we removed some barrier that’s keeping men and women from getting 
together. (For instance, in Japan, the same percentage of men and women are going without sex, so 
it’s not obviously a matter of direct intrasexual competition, or at least nothing leading to some men 
monopolizing all the sexual access to women.) Granted, conceptually, it seems inapt to say that (say) 
student loan forgiveness, which might help many reticent men (and women) feel more optimistic 
about starting a relationship and thereby reduce the number of involuntary celibates, would be 
“enforcing monogamy.” But other measures that an advocate of wide EMI might favor can be 
reasonably thought of as enforcing monogamy. For instance, while social scientists debate its 
significance, among incels, at least, porn addiction is widely blamed for their situation.41 (One 
“coomer” meme (the “coomer” is a compulsive masturbator with red, watery eyes) shows him 
staring at his screen while his possible-reality “trad” girlfriend disintegrates in the background.) 
Chastity norms also reasonably fall under “enforced monogamy,” interpreted in the wide sense. 
Underappreciated by researchers and usually moralistically dismissed by journalists who study incels 
is a widespread disgust for promiscuous women in this demographic. However offensively they may 
express the sentiment,42 it is as important to know if many men would rather be single than be with 
a woman with a high partner count as it is to know if women would rather be single than be with a 
man who is poor. Efforts to curb pornography addiction or female promiscuity, whether justified or 
not, could count as monogamy enforcement. (Obviously, a partisan of wide EMI might reject any 
number of initiatives that conceptually fall under enforced monogamy, just as an environmentalist 
might reject any number of ill-advised environmentalist proposals.) 
Nonetheless, in the quoted passages, Peterson could reasonably be read as meaning EMI in the 
narrower sense of blaming direct intrasexual competition for the lopsided distributions of female 
attention. In his blog post (unquoted) he adverts to Henrich’s research on polygamy, and even in 
Bowles’ quotes he seems to have intrasexual competition in mind, as when he says that, in situations 
with “too much mate choice,” “a small percentage of the guys have hyper-access to women, and so 
they don’t form relationships with women.”43 This suggests Peterson thinks an unregulated mating 
market reproduces some of the same problems associated with polygamy. Does he have a point? In 
 
41 Although more sexually active men also consume more pornography, there is reason to believe that, for many men, 
porn consumption serves as an adequate-enough substitute for sex that they are disincentivized from seeking out 
relationships. For more on this debates, see Jean Twenge, “Possible Reasons US Adults Are Not Having Sex as Much as 
They Used To,” JAMA 3(6) (June 12, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2767063; 
Philip Zimbardo, Man Interrupted, Newburyport, MA: Red Wheel, 2016. 
42 “In the elaborate incel taxonomy of participants in the sexual marketplace, I am a Becky, devoting my attentions to a 
Chad. I’m probably a “roastie,” too—another term they use for women with sexual experience, denoting labia that have 
turned into roast beef from overuse.” Jia Tolentino, “Rage of the Incels,” New Yorker, May 15, 2018, 
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-rage-of-the-incels.  
43 Bowles, “Jordan Peterson, Custodian of the Patriarchy.” 
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what remains of this section, I will develop the case for this “narrow” interpretation of EMI, as it 
might apply to the mating patterns of most industrialized countries today. 
We begin, as some “manosphere” theorists of the male predicament do,44 with “Sexual Economics 
Theory” (SET), pioneered by psychologists Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Vohs, and colleagues.45 
According to SET, a number of factors of the modern world conspire to split the traditional mating 
market into two, “bifurcated” markets: one for sex, and one for long-term mates/marriage. We need 
not repeat the material already discussed about how parental investment helped shape male and 
female mating strategies. But one prediction of parental investment theory ignored above but 
relevant to SET is that, although both women and men desire sex and long-term relationships, 
women will be more interested in long-term relationships, and men will be more interested in casual 
sex. This means women have a bargaining advantage when it comes to sex, and men have a 
bargaining advantage with regard to long-term relationships.46 SET predicts, accurately enough it 
seems, that in earlier societies, men on the mating market were primarily motivated by exclusive 
sexual access to young women, and young women were primarily motivated by the benefits of 
marriage to high-quality men—benefits that include not only quality genes, but also provisioning and 
protection for themselves and their children.47 As we have seen, whether the society is polygamous 
or monogamous matters a great deal to how these preferences are directed, but the transition from 
polygamy to monogamy didn’t change the ultimately transactional nature of mating: women “trade” 
sexual exclusivity for commitment and resources. The search for exclusive sexual access incentivized 
men—in the decade or so where their intelligence, creativity, and physical prowess are at their 
peak—to build homesteads, develop their talents, and elevate themselves socially. Likewise 
women—even in monogamous societies where women had relatively more safety and autonomy 
and thus married at a later age—still married in their prime reproductive years. However, the advent 
of effective birth control marked a monumental shift in human relations by detaching sex and 
reproduction. The significance of that development for SET is that birth control “bifurcated” the 
mating market into one for recreational sex and another for marriage. As harmless as that might 
sound, its consequences might be quite dire.  
First, the separation of sex and reproduction allows young people to pursue relatively riskless sex. 
For SET theorists, this means that women wishing to “lower” the price of sexual access could do so 
without much risk to themselves—indeed, offering sex at a lower price gives a young woman more 
access to male attention than she otherwise might have. Any vestiges of “slut shaming,” without 
being buttressed by a real fear of pregnancy, are insufficient to keep a significant number of women 
from lowering the commitment-costs of mating with them. This serves to break the “cartel” that 
women (and their parents) maintained on female sexual access. For although men usually respect 
 
44 “Roy Baumeister,” Incelwiki, https://incels.wiki/w/Roy_Baumeister; see also an online discussion by psychologist 
Todd Grande on the incel-sexual economics connection, “Sexual Economics Theory vs. Feminist Theory: MGTOW, 
INCEL, & Science,” June 17, 2019, https://youtu.be/M1R_pRxj9Zg.   
45 Roy Baumeister and Kathleen Vohs, “Sexual Economics: Sex as Female Resource for Social Exchange in 
Heterosexual Interactions,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 8, no. 4 (November 2004): 339–63. 
46 Roy Baumeister, Kathleen Catanese, and Kathleen Vohs, “Is There a Gender Difference in Strength of Sex Drive? 
Theoretical Views, Conceptual Distinctions, and a Review of Relevant Evidence,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 5, 
no. 3 (August 2001): 242–73. 
47 Roy Baumeister, Tania Reynolds, Bo Winegard, Kathleen Vohs, “Competing for Love: Applying Sexual Economics 
Theory to Mating Contests,” Journal of Economic Psychology 63 (2017): 230-241. 
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women who show sexual restraint, and would prefer one for a spouse, most men will have a hard 
time committing to one sexually restrained woman when many other women are offering sex 
without commitment. This causes a race to the bottom that leaves the many young women who are 
not interested in a string of meaningless liaisons and who would like to find a lifelong mate with 
whom to start a family faced with an impossible choice: have sex earlier, more often, and almost 
certainly with more men than they’d prefer, or be celibate and alone.48 
The predictable results of cheap sex and commitment-shy men is more out-of-wedlock births, lower 
rates of marriage, and later age of first marriage, all of which have happened (although of course 
other factors have played a large contributory role too, such as an increasing interest among women 
in getting educated and establishing careers). Less obvious and more controversial is that the mere 
cheapness of sex might be serving as, as Baumeister and Vohs put it, an “opiate of the (male) 
masses.”49 How so? Well, they and other sexual economics theorists take it as a theorem that men 
“will do whatever is required in order to obtain sex, and perhaps not a great deal more.”50 And that 
matters for the rest of us since, if they are correct, the contributions of ambitious young men are, for 
reasons ultimately biological, key to civilizational advance. Baumeister and Vohs do not mince 
words: 
[Women] are more risk averse, resulting in fewer entrepreneurs and inventions. (Baumeister 
2010 noted an appalling gender imbalance in new patents; nobody is seriously suggesting 
that the U.S. Patent office systematically discriminates against women, but women simply do 
not apply for patents in anything close to the rate that men do.) Women are less interested in 
science and technology fields. They create less wealth (for themselves and others). […] 
Female sociality is focused heavily on one-to-one relationships, whereas male sociality 
extends to larger groups networks of shallower relationships (e.g., Baumeister and Sommer 
1997; Baumeister 2010). Crudely put, women hardly ever create large organizations or social 
systems. That fact can explain most of the history of gender relations, in which the gender 
near equality of prehistorical societies was gradually replaced by progressive inequality—not 
because men banded together to oppress women, but because cultural progress arose from 
the men’s sphere with its large networks of shallow relationships, while the women’s sphere 
remained stagnant because its social structure emphasized intense one-to-one relationships 
to the near exclusion of all else (see Baumeister 2010). All over the world and throughout 
history (and prehistory), the contribution of large groups of women to cultural progress has 
been vanishingly small.51 
Whether Baumeister, Vohs, and their fellow travelers overstate this case or not is an empirical 
matter. What’s not empirical is the moral relevance of this fact, if it is a fact, when conjoined with a 
 
48 Baumeister and Vohs, “Sexual Economics,” 350ff; Mark Regnerus, Cheap Sex: The Transformation of Men, Marriage, and 
Monogamy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Steven Rhoads, “Hookup Culture: The High Costs of a Low 
‘Price’ for Sex, Society 49 (2012): 515–519. 
49 Roy Baumeister and Kathleen Vohs, “Sexual Economics, Culture, Men, and Modern Sexual Trends,” Society 49 (2012): 
520–524, 523. 
50 Baumeister and Vohs, “Sexual Economics, Culture, Men, and Modern Sexual Trends,” 521. 
51 Baumeister and Vohs, “Sexual Economics, Culture, Men, and Modern Sexual Trends,” 523, 522. For more discussion 
of male overrepresentation at the poles of accomplishment, see Roy Baumeister, Is There Anything Good About Men? How 
Cultures Flourish By Exploiting Men (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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moral outlook saying that we should raise the cost of cheap sex if it sabotages human capital in 
civilizational-threatening ways.  
So for SET the danger is easy sex—men, its theorists say, rarely exceed what is demanded of them to 
procure sex. But sex is still not all that easy for some men, as the phenomenon of inceldom 
demonstrates. Could we have fallen into a mating pattern that looks like social monogamy when it 
comes to marriage, but a degraded form of polygamy as far as sex is concerned? 
Because of female selectivity, sex without risk results in a windfall of uncommitted sex for men with 
the best short-term mating value. It is imperative to stress short-term mating value, because this 
observation lay at the core of Minassian’s resentment of “Chads.” Sexual liberation split apart not 
only the mating market, but also the features that made one a desirable mate. Harkening back to 
points made above, when selecting for short-term mates, where provisioning/protecting and 
commitment aren’t at issue, women will tend favor genetic quality as advertised by good looks and 
display. This means that the male beneficiaries of young women’s sexual favors will now tend to be 
those who in previous generations would be considered peacocks, bad boys, or otherwise poor 
marriage material. Independent lines of research have suggested that men may actually be born 
predisposed to pursue either long-term “dad” (high sexual fidelity and parental investment) or short-
term “cad” (more promiscuous and less parental investment) strategies, as evidenced by correlations 
between markers for testosterone (such as digit ratio), sexual precociousness, and “dark triad” 
(narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy) traits.52 Thus the big winners in the sex (not marriage) 
market tend to be effective short-term strategists.  
It is commonly claimed in manosphere forums that the distribution of female attention follows the 
Pareto Principle, which applied in this context would translate to 20% of the men getting 80% of 
female interest. Sociologist Mark Regnerus reports in his book Cheap Sex that, based on Relationships 
in America surveys, 20% of the heterosexual American men between 25 and 50 are having 70% of 
the sexual partnerships, and 10% are having about half of the sexual partnerships. (Although similar 
stats are seen on the female side of things, a heterosexual woman’s having lots of sexual partners 
reveals more about her sexual choices than her value on the mating market, for reasons discussed 
above.) Regnerus is quick to point out a few fallacious takeaways from this fact. First, it doesn’t 
mean that the most sexually successful men are having sex with 70% of the sexually active women; 
rather, they are merely involved in 70% of the sexual pairings, and most of these are likely to be with 
the fraction of most promiscuous women. Second, it doesn’t mean that these men have actual 
harems: overlaps in their (brief) relationships are fairly rare and short-lived, so a woman who has a 
relationship with one of these skillful short-term strategists is, in principle, still available for average 
guys.53 That said, Regnerus perceptively notes that, “if among the remaining 80 percent of men 
fidelity and a modest sexual history [for potential mates] are key values, then yes—the 20/70 
phenomenon may well be dragging down marriage rates in the peak years of fertility (twenties to 
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early thirties).”54 If indeed long-term strategists find women with higher partner counts less attractive 
as potential mates, then successful short-term strategists are not so much out-competing them on 
the marriage market as sabotaging them. 
We mustn’t confuse the most successful short-term strategists with the most desirable men (even on the 
uncommitted mating market): many of the former simply have low standards and hustle more for 
sex. More threatening for average men is what we see in the virtual marketplace of online dating, 
which to a greater extent favors what we might term a sexually attractive “Chad,” or at least a type 
of Chad. Infamously, women rate 80% of men’s Tinder profiles as “below average,”55 while on the 
dating app Hinge, half of female interest is directed to 15% of men, causing one data scientist to 
quip, “while the mythological ship-launcher, Helen, was a woman, it turns out that it’s actually the 
most attractive men who soak up the most disproportionate amount of their gender’s affection.”56 
When we apply the Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality often appealed to in economic 
arguments for wealth redistribution) to female interest for males on dating apps, it is equivalent to 
that of the most unequal countries in the world, such as Haiti, whereas the Gini coefficient for male 
interest in females is equivalent to the economies of Western Europe.57 It remains unclear how 
much of that interest translates into sex, however. It is also unclear whether these apps shape the 
way women shop for partners: it would appear that these apps favor handsome men who know how 
to market themselves visually and over chat functions, while disadvantaging (say) charismatic or 
laconic men, who might be very attractive in person. Anecdata suggests that the overwhelmingly 
negative feedback men experience on these apps is demoralizing huge swaths of quite eligible men. 
If, as is sometimes hypothesized, the virtual marketplace is nowadays seen as the only appropriate 
place to hit on a woman, then we are witnessing a major shift in the environment for 
courtship/sexual selection. 
Where does this leave the rest of the young males who are naturally more sexually restrained, less 
physically attractive, and maybe not particularly charismatic, but who in former generations might 
impress marriage-minded young women (and especially their parents) by creating businesses, 
developing their economically productive talents, and building homesteads? These males will have a 
much rougher time of it in a bifurcated mating market, where women can have risk-free sex without 
commitment. It is no exaggeration to say that how to respond to this dilemma may be the 
fundamental divide in manosphere thought. One response is to work harder at becoming a cad or a 
Chad, and these are main themes of the “pick-up artist” (PUA) and “Redpill” movements. Another 
response is simply to drop out of the mating market altogether, as represented by the MGTOW 
(“men going their own way”) and incel movements, whose partisans hold that the costs of pursuing, 
and even winning, a woman in today’s mating market are not worth it. 
 
54 Regnerus, Cheap Sex, 87. 
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In any event, we might reasonably conclude that either group at the mating extremes—those who 
get sex too easily, and those for whom it is (or perceived to be) unattainable—is to be minimized if 
we are concerned for what’s good for society and civilizational advance. The former have relatively 
less incentive than women do to settle down, and often continue to pursue reproductively prime-age 
women (low 20s), replicating some of the pressure for young women we see in polygamous cultures. 
In small numbers they are sustainable; but if the only way to win a young woman’s affections are, or 
are felt to be, to be a peacocking “alpha” or dark triad quasi-psychopathic narcissist, then we will see 
far too many men diverting their efforts from long days at the office to long workouts at the gym, 
opting to spend their money on clothes, cars, and nightclubs instead of down payments on homes. 
On the other extreme, discouraged young involuntary celibates also fail to contribute their talents to 
the civilizational commonweal. Of course, even many self-described “incels” work hard and find 
positive outlets in productive hobbies. But the talents and energies of too many are frittered away in 
escapist pursuits such as political message boards (where they are often radicalized), video games, 
pornography, and occasional prostitutes. Insofar as they still contemplate a relationship, they 
fantasize about removing themselves to some traditional society or impoverished country where 
they think they’ll be more attractive. In short, they act in some ways like reproductively unsuccessful 
men in polygamous cultures do, who often despair, revolt, or abandon everything for a shot in a 
foreign land.  
To sum up this section, it has been unclear up to this point how “enforced monogamy” is to be 
interpreted. Is it supposed to ease the competition involuntary celibates face from other men, who 
are dominating female attention? Or is it about increasing sexual restraint in a variety of ways (e.g., 
fostering norms against pornography and promiscuity), which in turn will result in a more egalitarian 
mating pattern and a smaller percentage of involuntarily celibate men? Although incels themselves 
acknowledge the role of factors other than direct intrasexual competition (such as porn overuse and 
a strong aversion to sexually experienced women) in causing their woes, Peterson seemed to have 
the former, narrower interpretation in mind when he prescribed enforced monogamy. And indeed, 
although not the whole story by any means, a lopsided distribution of female attention may be a 
significant stressor for involuntarily celibates, given the bifurcated mating market and the unequal 
distribution of attractive traits for short-term mates—traits, advocates stress, whose rewarding 
disincentivizes male contributions to civilization. 
Evaluating the EMI 
If we accept the premise that society has the right to impose informal and even formal sanctions on 
socially and civilizationally unsustainable mating patterns, and if we accept the thrust of Henrich et 
al.’s case for monogamy’s being an important civilizational adaptation, then social and legal barriers 
to polygamy seem warranted, at least for monogamous societies. If we apply the standards of 
environmental sustainability to civilizational sustainability, I think the only reasonable conclusion is 
that polygamy is to civilizations what the cattle industry or gas-fueled car engines are to the 
environment—unsustainable. So if polygamy isn’t one of our problems, let’s not let it become one. 
That said, and again in parallel with environmental sustainability, it is often practically (and almost 
always theoretically) possible to render an “unsustainable” practice “sustainable” by making changes 
elsewhere. If a country’s economy is rather inflexibly based on (say) coal for whatever reason, it may 
maintain that coal-based economy sustainably if (say) it captures the greenhouse gasses produced by 
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its factories, meaning that sustainability advocates will have a harder time justifying anti-coal policies 
for that country relative to other countries who don’t rely on coal as much or at all. Similarly, it is less 
problematic to reinforce existing anti-polygamy norms than to reform the sexual norms of a sexually 
liberated, post-contraceptive society. Censuring or even banning polygamy presents minimal costs 
on socially monogamous societies. The same cannot be said about enforcing monogamy on sexually 
unregulated but socially monogamous societies, where stricter norms of sexual monogamy would be 
highly disruptive. Although civilizational sustainability may demand reform of our mating patterns 
nonetheless, if there are less intrusive ways to effectively address an unsustainably high percentage of 
involuntary celibates (or unsustainably low birthrate, or any other mating-related civilizational 
threat), those should be pursued first.  
A presumption in favor of values such as liberty and autonomy would entail that, when it comes to 
unsustainable consumption and all else being equal, we should prefer social sanction to laws, prefer 
nudges58 to social sanction, and prefer education and persuasion to nudges. If that presumption is 
correct, then whether “enforced monogamy” is manifested in the form of laws, social sanction, or 
even nudges to reduce mating inequality, we should first try to educate ourselves out of the problem. 
Some of that education involves disseminating the (obviously still-controversial) message that highly 
unequal mate distributions, whether in the form of marriages or hookups, should be a matter of 
grave concern for all of us. But the most important educational intervention would be practical. Just 
as we may try to address a racial or sexual employment gap not merely through demanding hiring 
quotas but also (and perhaps preferably first) through efforts to better prepare underrepresented 
groups to be competitive in the job market, our parents, educators, coaches, and counselors should 
be making a more deliberate effort to instruct young women on how to be savvier about their 
mating choices given their long-term interests, and training young men on how to be more attractive 
mates and better marriage material.  
The proposal is hardly radical: preparing young people for romance and marriage used to be the 
central goals of church functions, community dances, and finishing schools. True, even if the 
traditional cultural scripts taught in these venues were to become attractive once again, the 
challenges of modernity (some of which were touched on above) make them almost impossible for 
young people to actually follow. Nonetheless, we mustn’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. If 
traditionalist messaging is incorrect about what makes us more attractive mates and partners and/or 
demands the impossible of young people, then we should change the content, not eliminate the 
training altogether. Sexual assault training and sex-education courses do this to an extent; but safe 
sex, free of coercion, is a very low bar indeed.59 Happily, we have some excellent examples of 
thoughtful, scientifically-informed, and popular courses at universities designed to educate students 
about human nature, the virtues of dating with discernment, and the dynamics of courtship.60 
Indeed, Peterson’s own transition from popular intellectual to guru is largely attributable to the way 
 
58 Richard Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2009). 
59 See Rhoads, “Hookup Culture” for a critique of some this programming, as it concern informing young people of the 
emotional costs of hookup culture. Indeed, it could appear at times that sex and relationship education is almost 
designed to undermine the psychological wellbeing and reproductive futures of those it’s meant to serve.  
60 Such as psychologist Alexandra Solomon’s “Marriage 101” course at Northwestern, or Boston College’s Kerry Cronin, 
a philosophy professor who has lectured on the importance on dating for almost two decades: see e.g., her recorded talk 
“Hanging Out and Hooking Up,” February 9, 2015, https://youtu.be/60K2-LEDPyg.  
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his lectures on sex differences, personality, and responsibility inspired and equipped legions of 
young men to be less resentful, awkward, and self-sabotaging. So yes, the increased competition 
posed by cads and Chads who, on traditional monogamy, would have been avoided or quickly 
married off is probably an additional challenge facing today’s young men looking for love. 
Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that intrasexual competition is not the involuntary celibate’s biggest 
obstacle to sex and marriage, and thus that enforced monogamy probably shouldn’t be first on our 
list of remedies for their predicament.  
